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Abstract
This paper investigates the behavioural effects of competitive, social-value and social-
image incentives on men’s and women’s allocation of effort in a multi-task environment.
Specifically, using two real-effort laboratory tasks, we investigate how competitive prizes,
social-value generation and public awards affect effort allocation decisions between the
tasks. We find that all three types of incentives significantly focus effort allocation towards
the task they are applied in, but the effect varies significantly between men and women. The
highest effort distortion lies with competitive incentives, which is due to the effort allocation
decision of men. Women exert similar amount of effort across the three incentive conditions,
with slightly lower effort levels in the social-image incentivized tasks. Our results inform how
and why genders differences may persist in competitive workplaces.
Introduction
Incentives in multi-task settings have received increasing attention in recent years. More
employers than ever before require employees to multitask between different job responsibili-
ties, a trend that has increased with the economic downturn as a means to save on labor costs
[1–3]). Multi-tasking is evident in academic jobs, where university lecturers are involved in
teaching, research and administrative duties [4], [5]. Similarly, most clinically active surgeons
in medical centers are required to conduct research as well as examine patients and perform
clinical procedures [6]. It has been argued that in these multi-task settings gender inequalities
prevail: leading figures from Cambridge University in the UK have recently argued that the
lack of women in top academic positions may be attributed to the way different job tasks are
rewarded [7]. Academic promotions, they claim, are based on rigid and highly competitive
research outcomes, such as publications and research grants, and much less on teaching and
public engagement. Therefore, the criteria for success may benefit men more than women.
Motivated by this observation, our study explores how various incentive schemes affect effort
distortion across multiple tasks and how incentive effects are determined by the employee’s
gender and economic preferences.
Previous evidence on singleton tasks has shown that there are indeed gender variations in
how men and women respond to different types of incentives. Under competitive incentive
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schemes men have been shown to perform better than women [8], [9]. This result is particu-
larly strong for tasks that are male-stereotyped indicating the importance of stereotype threat
[10]. Competitive incentives have long been utilized in the private sector with emphasis given
to relative performance evaluations. Increasingly governments have been arguing for the adop-
tion of relative performance-related-pay schemes in public services such as healthcare, educa-
tion, law enforcement and the civil service [11]. In contrast, women tend to perform better
when they are given social-value incentives [12], [13]. These types of schemes are more preva-
lent in the public and non-profit sectors but are also becoming a feature in the private sector
through firm engagement in corporate social responsibility and philanthropic projects.
Despite the growing evidence on gender differences in singleton settings, there is no empir-
ical evidence on the effectiveness of competitive, social-value and social-image incentives on
effort allocation levels for each gender in a multi-task setting. This remains one of the biggest
gaps in the literature of multitasking, and an important one given the growing use of multi-
task working environments [14–16]. An editorial note by [17] calls for more research on het-
erogeneous effectiveness of incentives with a special emphasis on demographic characteristics
such as gender, ethnicity, age and nationality. Yet, these type of studies are still limited in
multi-task settings.
A number of studies from single-task settings have focused on one incentive type at a time.
It has been shown that gender differences under competitive payment schemes [8], [9], [18]
are due to differences in risk preferences, confidence [19–21], aversion to receive relative per-
formance feedback and willingness to compete [22], [23]. Women have been shown to be
more motivated by social-value generation compared to men [12], [13], [24], [25] due to dif-
ferences in pro-sociality and attitudes towards social and non-profit organizations [26–29].
There is varied evidence of gender differences in response to social-image incentives. [3], [30],
[31] show that men are more motivated by social-image concerns than women which has been
explained by the evolutionary motivation of men to raise their social-status [32], [33]. More
recent evidence from field and lab experiments [34–37], closely related to our design of social-
image incentives, found no evidence of higher performance of men compared to women in
public award/ranking treatments. Our study thus closely link to this strand of literature, but
investigates the effectiveness of incentives for each gender as an allocation decision in a multi-
task setting: specifically we aim to investigate the effort decisions in the presence of another
task, which provides a clear opportunity cost of effort in a task the additional incentive is
applied to.
We use experimental methodologies to reach our aim of cleanly comparing the effective-
ness of incentives by gender and economic preferences. The multi-task setting that we con-
sider involves working on two distinct tasks under a restricted work time, which induces
substitutability between the tasks. We pre-test five different real-effort tasks to choose the two
with the most similar characteristics. We then use these two tasks where one of the tasks is
always incentivized by a piece-rate in all treatments. In a between-subject design we vary the
incentives applied to the other task. In the control condition, we use fixed pay and in three
treatment conditions we use competitive, social-value and social-image incentives.
We find strong evidence that incentives have differential effects on the effort allocation
decisions of men and women. All three types of incentives significantly distort effort allocation
decisions towards the task to which they are applied on compared to the piece-rate paying sec-
ond task. Subjects earn significantly less in the social-value and social-image treatments
emphasising the social preferences of subjects and their willingness to sacrifice some of their
earnings for a social cause. The highest distortion of effort across the tasks is in the competitive
incentive treatment, which is solely due to the effort allocation decisions of men. Further we
observe that men’s effort allocation under the social-image incentives is higher compared to
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the one under social-value incentives, underlining the importance of social-image concerns
for men. The effort allocation decision of women, on the other hand, is the same across all
three incentive treatments, with a marginally lower contribution under the social-image incen-
tives compared to the one under social-value incentives which can be explained by the previ-
ously observed ‘wallflower effect’ [38]. We find limited evidence of economic preferences
determining the effectiveness of incentives: only the attitudes towards donating to social causes
significantly predicts effort allocation in a social-value generating task away from piece-rate
paying task.
In contrast to the extant experimental studies in multi-task settings, we increase the external
validity and generalizability of our results by designing an experiment with real effort rather
than chosen effort tasks. A similar line of research was undertaken by [16], [39] who also used
real effort tasks and online experiments to increase the external validity of their studies. How-
ever, both of these studies use task complementarity to study the interaction between the per-
formance-related private and social incentives and the effort allocation decisions. One of the
most similar designs to ours is [40] who also use two tasks, keeping incentives in one task con-
stant and varying incentives (piece-rate, team and tournament) in the other task, to explore
how incentives affect effort allocation decisions. They find that competitive tournament incen-
tives produce more variable and higher effort levels followed by team incentives and piece-rate
incentives. [15] is another study investigating the effectiveness of incentives across multiple
real effort tasks. Their study finds that public visibility of relative performance feedback has a
significant effect on effort allocation between the tasks: feedback improves subjects’ effort in
total but distorts effort allocation towards the task in which performance feedback is publicly
visible. While [40] do not report any results pertaining to gender, [15] report that they do not
find any gender differences. The main reason for this could be that performance-related feed-
back affect both genders similarly. We discuss further our findings in the light of previous
studies and implications in the concluding section of the paper.
Experimental design
Basic experimental design
The experiment consisted of two parts, a single-task and a multi-task part, both of which
involved working on the slider task and the counting zeros task. The selection of these two
tasks was based on a pre-test experiment, which was conducted among 18 subjects. The pre-
test experiment explored the within-subject correlations between five real-effort tasks. Five
tasks, the circle task [41], the counting zeros task [42], the ball-catching task [43], the slider
task [44], [45] and the number adding task [18] were presented to subjects in a random order.
Based on a within-subject analysis, we found that the highest correlation was between the
slider task and the counting zeros task both in terms of actual performance and perceptions of
the difficulty level. Aiming for characteristically very similar tasks to control for heterogeneous
preferences for and performances in each task, we selected these two tasks as the most suitable
for the purposes of our main experiment. The experiment was submitted for ethical review
and was granted favorable opinion by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee (UEC/2015/
042/FBEL). Written consent was obtained from all participants and the data was analyzed
anonymously.
In the single-task part of our experiment, subjects sequentially received instructions about
the two tasks they had to complete and had 5 minutes to complete each task. The order of the
presentation of the two tasks was randomized to avoid any potential order effects. They had to
complete each task separately and the performance in each task served as a control for hetero-
geneous abilities. At the end of a task, subjects received feedback on the number of correctly
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positioned sliders and completed counting zeros tables, which eliminated any potential uncer-
tainty in subjects’ knowledge of their absolute ability levels. They were paid a piece rate of
£0.10 per correct completion both in the slider and counting zeroes tasks, and the total earning
in the single-task part was the sum of piece-rate earnings from both tasks.
After the single-task part, subjects completed a mid-study questionnaire that elicited demo-
graphic information (gender, age, and nationality) and self-reported economic preferences
(general risk attitudes, competitiveness, confidence and attitudes towards donating to charities
and social institutions) on a 7-item Likert-scale. By eliciting a number of demographic and
psychological constructs we aimed to remove the salience of gender that could activate gen-
der-related stereotypes and eliminate any possible experimenter demand effects [46]. The
main reason for using mid-study rather than end-of study questionnaire was to ask subjects to
choose a charity organization that they regularly donate to or whose activities they support
from a list of charities offered. They could also fill in the charity of their liking that was not on
the list. The chosen charity was then used in the next part of the experiment, where we induced
social-value incentives as donations to chosen charities. Additionally, we chose to elicit the
four economic preferences as they were identified by the previous literature to predict compet-
itiveness, social preferences and image-seeking behaviour of subjects in single-task settings.
The self-reported measures of economic preferences were similar to the validated survey
instruments developed by [47] who show strong correlations of the measures with many real
life and laboratory decisions. At the end of the questionnaire, we asked subjects which task
they enjoyed most such that they could choose either one, both or neither. This question was
aimed at controlling for subjects’ personal preferences for the tasks.
After the completion of the mid-study questionnaire, the multi-task part of the experiment
started. Subjects had to multi-task for 10 minutes between the slider and the counting zeros
tasks presented to them on the same screen. This part of the experiment consisted of four
between-subject treatments where all subjects in a session participated in the same treatment.
In all four treatments, subjects had to position a minimum of 10 sliders to receive a fixed rate
of £3 and additionally they could earn a piece rate of £0.10 per completed counting zeros table.
If subjects positioned less than 10 sliders their earnings from the multi-task part would be
equal to £0. The fixed rate of £3 for a minimum correctly completed 10 sliders served two pur-
poses. First, it helped to control the experimenter demand effect [46] that could affect the effort
allocation decision in the slider task: subjects might have felt obliged to position a certain num-
ber of sliders since the task was on their screens. Second, our design mimicked the real world
multi-task work environment where one of the tasks has a minimum required work load to be
completed, otherwise the worker could get fired. For example, academics are required to pro-
vide a certain number of teaching hours [48], surgeons have to see a certain number of patients
in a week and manufacturing workers have to adhere to minimum quality standards.
Experimental treatments
Across the four treatments, we manipulated whether subjects received additional incentives
for their effort in the slider task. The Baseline condition lacked any additional incentives other
than those described above and served as a control condition. In the other three treatments,
we manipulated the additional incentives applied to the fixed rate paying slider task whilst
keeping the piece rate in the counting zeroes task constant. In the Charity treatment, the slider
task was a social-value generating task where subjects could earn a donation of £0.10 for a
charity of their choice per each slider they positioned correctly exceeding the minimum of 10
sliders. While completing the mid-study questionnaire, subjects were not aware that we would
use the chosen charities in the later parts of the experiment. This treatment measured the effect
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of social-value incentives on effort allocation decisions between the tasks compared to the
Baseline. The Charity treatment mimicked the environment of working in corporate social
responsibility or corporate philanthropy projects, where certain job tasks and projects improve
societal welfare [49], [50]. It also mimicked social service jobs such as academic multitasking
where academics have to undertake multiple job tasks for the university such as teaching, pub-
lishing articles, gaining research grants and administration. There is some debate in the litera-
ture whether these roles are complementary or [51], and the nature of teaching-research nexus
depends on the academic discipline (soft sciences versus hard-applied sciences) and the level
of teaching (undergraduate versus postgraduate) as shown by [52–53]. In situations where the
academic tasks are substitutable, the effort spent on teaching has a direct third party benefit (to
students) compared to research activities that are considered to have more of a private value in
terms of career progression and job mobility [4]. [5] further show that in gender differences in
career progression in academia hence may persist.
We assessed the effect of social-image incentives on effort allocation decision across the
tasks in the CharityImage treatment where we designed the treatment according to [54] defini-
tion of social-image being positional, desirable and non-tradable. Social image is achieved via
favourable comparison to others in socially recognized situations, hence positional. Social
image is also desirable, because good social image brings along some benefit. Finally, social
image is non-tradable in the sense that it cannot be directly purchased. Instead, it must be
gained individually and, therefore, it must be acquired through actions that are visible. Hence,
in social value generating settings, people concerned with obtaining high social image will
strive to appear more generous. In addition to donations earned for every slider exceeding the
minimum of 10, subjects were told that the names of the top three highest donors in a session
would be publicly announced and they would be awarded with a Thank You! certificate. The
certificate was signed by the project grant holder and thanked the participants for their dona-
tion. The “Thank you!” certificate is included in Appendix A in S1 File. This design choice was
inspired by a field experiment [34] and a lab experiment [35] which show significant effect of
public recognition and awards on effort. We chose to use a certificate award rather than the
visibility of donations as our manipulation of social-image incentives to reduce the “wallflower
effect” (an aversion to deviate from average behavior) previously reported in experiments [38].
Finally, in the Prize treatment, we measured the effect of competitive financial incentives
on effort allocation decisions between the two tasks. In this treatment, in addition to Baseline
incentives subjects could earn a £5 prize if their performance in the fixed rate paying slider
task was in the top three performances in their session. The amount of £5 was determined so
that the prize is slightly less than the total donation made in a Charity session divided by three,
thus making the treatments comparable. We ran one session of the Charity treatment before
the first session of the Prize treatment to identify the average amount donated in a session and
calibrate its financial prize equivalent.
By comparing Charity to Baseline, we can determine how social-value generation affects
effort allocation; by comparing CharityImage to Charity, we can determine whether social-
image affects effort allocation and finally by comparing Prize to CharityImage we can identify
the effect of competitive private monetary rewards as opposed to competitive social-value gen-
eration effects on effort allocation. After the presentation of the multi-task instructions, sub-
jects had to answer control questions to make sure that they have understood the incentives
correctly. Subjects could start the multi-tasking part only after they have answered all control
questions correctly. The full questionnaire and the experimental instructions are presented in
Appendix A in S1 File. Table 1 summarises the incentives used in the multi-task part.
It is worth noting that compared to previous literature that focuses on gender differences
and incentives, we employ a continuous decision variable rather than a binary [22], [25]. This
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is similar to more recent studies that have looked at how subjects choose the percentage of their
compensation to be based on piece-rate versus competitive incentive [55] or what subjects’ will-
ingness to accept competitive incentive is [56]. Similarly our experiment uses continuous effort
allocation decision between two differently incentivized tasks and extends the incentives to
social-value and social-image incentives as well as competitively incentivized tasks.
Procedures
At the beginning of the experiment subjects knew that only one of the (single-task or multi-
task) parts would be randomly selected to be paid out. By using the random incentive system
to pay subjects, we controlled for income effects and other potential interdependencies
between the single-task and multi-task parts. The random incentive system is a widely used
experimental procedure. For a discussion of its rationale and possible limitations see [57]. At
the end of the multi-task part, subjects received feedback about their performance in both
parts, the amount of donations they contributed to their chosen charity (in the Charity and
ChairtyImage treatments) and whether they were in the top three of the session in their slider
task performance (in the CharityImage and Prize treatments). In the CharityImage treatment,
we also publicly announced the participation numbers of the top three donors, made them
stand up and awarded them with a “Thank You!” certificate. All subjects were then privately
paid in their cubicles.
We recruited subjects through advertising our study via weekly student-union newsletter,
posters and handouts distributed around the campus. In total 210 subjects participated in the
experiment with 54% female and 26% from social science departments. There were 42 subjects
in the Baseline (4 sessions), 51 in the Charity (4 sessions), 65 in the CharityImage (5 sessions)
and 52 in the Prize (5 sessions) treatments. The number of subjects in a session varied between
10 and 15 subjects depending on the number of fifteen registered subjects to show up to the
experiment. While subjects knew that the experiment was for 15 participants when they signed
up, they were not aware of how many exactly showed up as we seated them in their cubicles as
soon as they arrived. This ensures that perceptions of probability of winning in Prize and
CharityImage treatments were not affected by the actual number of subjects in a session. The
experiments were conducted at a large university in the United Kingdom and were pro-
grammed using the software Ztree [58]. We ensured that the timing of sessions for each treat-
ment was counterbalanced to account for time and day-of-the-week effects. Subjects received
£5 for participating in one-hour session and additionally earned an average of £6.2.
Results
We first present the descriptive statistics and conduct a parametric analysis of the determi-
nants of single-task part performance in the slider and counting zeros tasks. We then look at
Table 1. Incentives in the multi-task part.
Baseline:
£3 fixed rate for minimum of 10 sliders
Piece rate of £0.10 for counting zeros task
Charity:
Baseline + £0.10 donation per each additional slider in excess of
the minimum
Prize:
Baseline + £5 prize for the top three slider task
performers
CharityImage:
Charity + public certificate award for the top three donors
The incentives for the counting zeros task was kept constant at £0.10 per correctly completed table across all
treatments.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t001
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the multi-task part and test whether competitive, social-value and social-image incentives dis-
tort effort allocation decisions between the two tasks compared to the Baseline condition. We
test whether the effectiveness of the incentives shows gender variability and how men and
women respond to each incentive and whether economic preferences of individuals predict
their behaviour.
Single-task effort
In the single-task part of the experiment, the average number (standard deviation) of com-
pleted sliders was 42.8 (12.3) with a minimum of 13 and maximum of 76 sliders. The average
number (s.d.) of completed counting zeros tables were 28.2 (6.2) with a minimum of 9 and
maximum of 48 counting zeros tables. In Table 2, we test whether any of the observable char-
acteristics of subjects significantly predict the performance in the tasks. We observe a signifi-
cantly lower performance in the Slider task and higher performance in the Counting Zeros
task by females. The result is consistent with the previous finding [44], [45] who also find
lower performance of women in the Slider task; we are however not aware of previous evi-
dence showing a higher performance of females in the counting zeros task. We also find a
lower performance of older subjects in the slider task but not in the counting zeros task. These
results have some potential implications on future experimental studies that use slider and
counting zeros tasks in gender and age varied subject pools, especially if either of these vari-
ables are the main point of interest. We thus use subjects’ single-task performance as an indi-
vidual ability control in the parametric analysis of multi-task part, which eliminates any
potential issues studying the gender interaction with the effectiveness of incentives.
We find a significant correlation in performance between the two tasks consistent with the
pre-test results that identified the Slider and Counting Zeros tasks as the most similar tasks.
Absent any strategic considerations, the positive correlation between the tasks supports that
Table 2. Single-task part performance.
Dependent Variable Slider
task performance
Counting Zeroes
task performance
Female -7.562 (1.65)��� 2.015 (0.72)��
Age -0.491 (0.09)��� -0.054 (0.04)
British -0.724 (1.45) 1.391 (0.89)
RiskTaking 0.148 (0.64) 0.225 (0.37)
Confidence -1.451 (0.66)�� 0.246 (0.49)
Competitiveness 0.490 (0.52) 0.026 (0.39)
DonationAttitude -0.424 (0.66) -0.384 (0.21)
FavouriteSlider -1.163 (1.61) -0.997 (0.65)
FavouriteCountingZeros -5.388 (1.44)��� 1.849 (1.19)
CountingZeroSingletask 0.707 (0.10)���
SliderSingletask 0.206 (.03)���
Constant 46.02 (5.16)��� 18.00 (3.34)���
N 210 210
Adj R2 0.3442 0.2370
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression. Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses.� 10%
�� 5%
��� 1% significance levels. RiskTaking, Confidence, Competitiveness and DonationAttitude are self-reported economic preference measures from the mid-study
questionnaire. FavouriteSlider and FavouriteCountingZeros are dummy variables of whether subjects reported enjoying one of the tasks more than the other.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t002
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there was not an endogenous conflict between the tasks per se. This enables us to exogenously
induce conflict into the multi-task part of the experiment by explicitly manipulating incentives
and restricting work time. We find no significant correlation between favouring a task and
performance in a task. The insignificance of the correlation between favouring a task and scor-
ing high in a task is encouraging and potentially means that personal preferences play a negli-
gible role in exerted effort levels under piece-rate incentives. Additionally, we check whether
single-task performance measures were the same across the experimental sessions and treat-
ment conditions. We cannot reject the hypothesis that effort in the single-task part was the
same across the sessions and the treatments (all p-values>0.100). Overall, the results of the sin-
gle-task part are reassuring and enable us to control for individual heterogeneity in perfor-
mance and personal preferences independent of any other strategic considerations when
analysing the effectiveness of incentives in the multi-task part.
Effort allocation in the multi-task part
In Fig 1 and Table 3, we present the distribution of effort allocated to the fixed rate paying
slider task and piece-rate paying counting zeros task in the multi-task part of the experiment
across the four treatments. On inspection, the graphs show that all three incentive conditions
Fig 1. Effort allocation in the multi-task part of the experiment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.g001
Table 3. Pairwise comparisons between the treatments.
Sliders Baseline Prize Charity Counting Zeros Baseline Prize Charity
Pairwise comparison of distributions
Wilcoxon ranksum p-value
Prize <0.001 0.000
Charity <0.001 0.232 0.000 0.409
CharityImage <0.001 0.306 0.734 0.000 0.086 0.354
Pairwise Comparison of the means
t-test p-value (2-tailed)
Prize <0.001 0.000
Charity <0.001 0.010 0.000 0.393
CharityImage <0.001 0.019 0.504 0.000 0.035 0.141
Pairwise comparison of variances
Levene’s robust p-value
Prize <0.001 0.001
Charity <0.001 <0.001 0.354 0.007
CharityImage <0.001 <0.001 0.125 0.549 0.002 0.707
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t003
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are effective in increasing effort levels in the slider task that they are applied to. A non-
parametric test on the equality of distributions shows significant differences between Baseline
and the other three treatments. In the Baseline condition, the average number of completed
sliders is 18 (s.d. 8.31), slightly above the minimum level of required 10 sliders. Since we did
not give our subjects any feedback on the number of correctly positioned sliders while they
were performing the task, subjects took an extra care not to fall below the minimum threshold
10 sliders by completing on average 18 sliders. The average number of completed sliders is the
highest in the Prize treatment with 51 (s.d. 40.23), followed by the CharityImage treatment
with 37 (21.02) and the Charity treatment with 35 (s.d. 18.02) sliders. A Wilcoxon-ranksum
test on the equality of distributions shows significant differences in average effort level in the
slider task between the treatments and Baseline conditions (p-value<0.000). Comparing the
distributions of effort levels in the slider task across the three treatment conditions, the results
show significantly higher effort level in the Prize treatment compared to the Charity and Char-
ityImage treatments (p-value = 0.012 and 0.011, respectively). Table A in Appendix B in S1
File presents the results of an OLS regression across the three different model specifications to
test whether the differences between the treatments are robust to model specifications. We
find robust effect of incentives on the effort allocation in the slider task to the inclusion of
additional variables such as single-task part performance, demographics and reported eco-
nomic preferences. Panel (b) of Fig 1 presents the equivalent analysis of the effort level allo-
cated in the counting zeros task demonstrating a mirror image of the effort allocations in the
slider task. The only difference in the multi-task effort levels in the two tasks is in the differ-
ences in variance between the two charity treatments. The variability in effort levels in the
slider task is higher in the two charity treatments than in the Baseline whereas variability in
effort levels in the counting zeros task is not significantly different between the two charity
treatments and the Baseline condition. Additionally please see Figure A in Appendix B in S1
File the cumulative density function of the completed sliders in each treatment.
Result 1. Competitive, social-value and social-image incentives are effective in increasing
effort levels distorting effort levels away from piece rate paying task. The highest distortion is
observed in the case of competitive incentives.
We further explore whether the variability in the effort levels in the multi-task part within
each treatment is significantly predicted by subjects’ economic preferences. In Table 4, we test
for heterogeneous effects of incentives on effort allocation decisions reporting the results from
a linear regression; the most notable finding is that controlling for other observable character-
istics, subjects with higher attitudes to donating to charities complete higher number of sliders
and lower number of counting zeros tables in the Charity and CharityImage treatments.
Given that we administered the questionnaire to subjects prior to them working in the
multi-task part, it is highly improbable that the behaviour in the experiment affected subjects’
responses in the questionnaire. The opposite however can be true such that their responses in
the questionnaire may have affected their effort allocation decisions in the multi-task part by
psychologically triggering social and competitive cues. However, we find only very limited
support of this. The variable measuring donation attitudes has a small effect on the effort allo-
cation decision in the multi-task part (difference of approximately 2 sliders), while the other
variables have no significant effect (e.g. contrary to expectations, reporting higher competitive-
ness has no effect on effort allocation into the competitive slider task).
As a measure of ability levels we find that in the Prize and CharityImage treatments, single-
task performance in the slider task significantly predicts the number of sliders completed in
the multi-task part. While we cannot test whether the higher number of completed sliders is
due to the self-selection of more able subjects into competitively incentivized tasks or merely
caused by their ability to complete more sliders in a given time, we can draw parallels with the
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previous literature who find similar results. There are number of previous findings of more
able individuals reacting more positively to competitive environments by [34], [35] on the
effect of awards in a single-task settings and van [40] on the effect of competitive prizes on
effort levels in a multi-task setting. Yet a field study [59] finds that in single-task settings
awards can be similarly (or even more) motivating to underperforming employees compared
to overperforming ones.
Result 2. We find limited evidence of the effectiveness of incentives depending on prefer-
ences of subjects. Only in the Charity and CharityImage treatments, individual attitudes to
donating to charities significantly predict how much effort subjects redistribute from a piece-
rate paying counting zeros task to a social-value generating slider task.
Gender differences in effort allocation
The visual evidence of the effectiveness of incentives on effort allocation decisions in the slider
and counting zeros tasks for men and women is presented in Fig 2. In the Baseline condition,
both women and men complete around 18 sliders. Men complete slightly higher number of
counting zeros tables but this difference is not statistically significant: mean number of count-
ing zeros tables completed is 54.5 for men and 49.5 for women (Wilcoxon-ranksum p-value =
0.355). The reported p-values are from a Wilcoxon-ranksum tests across the genders and treat-
ment conditions, unless otherwise specified.
In the Prize treatment, we observe differences between men and women in the multi-task
part: men and women on average complete 62.6 and 38.8 sliders (p-value = 0.0315) and 29.4
Table 4. Variation in multi-task effort and self-reported economic preferences.
Dependent variable Number of completed sliders in the multi-task part Number of completed counting zeros tables in the multi-task part
Prize Charity CharityImage Prize Charity CharityImage
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Risk taking .89 1.78 -3.08 -2.95 1.84 1.01 -1.83 -1.78 1.34 2.64 -.68 -.82
(2.76) (2.96) (2.96) (2.10) (2.79) (2.52) (1.30) (1.27) (1.62) (1.63) (1.55) (1.71)
Confidence 1.11 1.72 -.30 -.22 -.13 .54 -.81 -.78 -1.02 -.15 1.55 1.66
(3.63) (2.03) (1.82) (1.99) (1.40) (1.30) (1.00) (.93) (2.48) (1.49) (1.45) (1.44)
Competitive 15.71 17.51 -1.77 -1.75 -5.05 -8.23 -10.83 -10.74 4.56 4.72 2.22 1.66
(16.29) (16.73) (7.29) (7.46) (7.21) (5.10) (8.66) (8.76) (5.38) (3.97) (4.09) (4.63)
Donation Attitude 1.25 .07 2.23� 2.42� 2.27�� 2.45� -.71 -.76 -5.56�� -3.60�� -2.07�� -1.68�
(3.52) (3.54) (1.27) (1.06) (1.08) (1.01) (1.75) (1.65) (2.06) (1.11) (.69) (1.04)
Favourite ST 31.05� 35.06 -4.11 -3.56� 6.72 2.46 -21.75 -21.57 -.159 5.52 -5.09 -5.37
(15.66) (18.51) (3.12) (1.43) (4.75) (1.76) (11.78) (11.55) (3.99) (5.10) (6.00) (5.56)
Favourite CZT 5.80 11.28 4.55 5.06 -1.26 -1.14 -.38 -.12 -1.06 4.05 4.73 4.75
(15.81) (15.96) (4.56) (5.61) (4.84) (3.23) (7.29) (7.89) (4.79) (5.86) (2.71) (2.84)
SliderSingletask 1.26�� .08 .80�� .06 .81�� -5.37
(.470) (.311) (.27) (.20) (.27) (5.56)
Constant 11.46 -48.84 39.35� 33.90 27.69 -13.5 65.52��� 62.7��� 63.04� 7.20 45.37��� 38.13��
(33.99) (31.15) (16.49) (35.90) (15.88) (21.84) (10.97) (15.74) (22.16) (30.27) (9.88) (13.1)
N 52 52 51 51 65 65 52 52 51 51 65 65
Adj R2 0.1881 0.3376 0.0867 0.088 0.0467 0.181 0.3135 0.3146 0.1502 0.4809 0.1378 0.1468
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression. Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses.
� 10%
�� 5%
��� 1% significance levels. ST and CZT stand for slider and counting zeros tasks respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t004
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and 37.9 counting zeros tables (p-value = 0.1607), respectively. The parametric analysis of the
data, reported in Table 5, provides further evidence of significant differences between men
and women in their effort allocation decisions in the slider task. The coefficient of the interac-
tion term FemalePrize is negative and significant under all three model specifications that con-
trol for individual single-task slider performance and other self-reported preferences of
subjects. The result is consistent with the previous literature showing that when given a choice
of incentives, men self-select into competitive work environments whereas women choose
non-competitive payment schemes [18], [60]. Differently from these studies that focus on
binary decision of men and women on whether to take up competitively incentivized task or
not, our results provide evidence on how much effort to allocate between the two incentivized
tasks, using a continuous dependent variable. This is similar to the recent papers [55], [56]
who also use continuous measure of competitiveness and find that women have significantly
lower willingness to accept competitive incentive schemes and only one-fifth of the most com-
petitive quartile are women. Our subjects also had a choice of allocating positive amount of
effort between competitively paid slider task or piece-rate paid counting zeros task and women
Fig 2. Effort allocations in the multi-task part by gender.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.g002
Table 5. Incentives and gender.
Dependent Variable: Number of Completed Sliders in the Multi-task part
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Female 0.31 (2.31) 4.93 (3.08) 5.48 (3.69)
Prize 45.20 (8.15)��� 47.11 (8.59)��� 47.97 (7.91)���
Charity 13.34 (3.23)��� 17.62 (4.61)��� 17.16 (4.58)���
CharityImage 22.45 (3.05��� 24.59(3.55)��� 26.64 (4.74)���
FemalePrize -24.11 (7.65)��� -25.22 (7.74)��� -25.12 (7.08)���
FemaleCharity 5.72 (5.89) 2.64 (6.35) 3.43 (6.44)
FemaleChairtyImage -5.45 (3.43) -6.41 (3.06)� -8.87 (4.06)��
SliderSingletask 0.43 (.14)��� 0.55(.18)���
Controls No No Yes
Constant 17.44 (1.66) -4.82 (7.55) -38.56 (17.10)��
N 210 210 210
Adj R2 0.2179 0.2500 0.3004
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression. Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses.
� 10%
�� 5%
��� 1% significance levels. Controls include the economic preferences self-reported in the mid-study questionnaire and a number of subjects in a session.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t005
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choose to spend less effort on the slider task than men: 80% of women choose to complete less
than 50 sliders while this figure is 40% for men.
Result 3. In the presence of a piece-rate paying counting zeros task, men exert more effort
than women on the slider task when the slider task is incentivized by competitive incentives.
There are no gender difference in effort levels between men and women when the slider task is
incentivized by social-value and social-image incentives.
Another novel result that we observe from Fig 2 is the similarity of effort allocation deci-
sions of women in the slider task across the three treatment conditions: 38.8 in the Prize, 36.8
in the Charity and 34.7 in the CharityImage treatments (pairwise p-values>0.100). The effort
levels of men, on the other hand, in the two charity treatments is significantly lower compared
to the Prize treatment: 62.6 in the Prize treatment versus 30.7 in the Charity (p-value = 0.003)
and 40 in the CharityImage (p-value = 0.015) treatments. Testing for the differences in allo-
cated effort levels in the slider task of men between the Charity and CharityImage treatments,
we observe a marginally higher effort in the CharityImage treatment compared to the Charity
treatment (p-value = 0.074). The parametric analysis of the number of completed sliders in the
multi-tasking part (Table 6) provides further support for this result showing significant posi-
tive effect of the social-image incentives on men’s (post-estimation Wald p-values<0.050) and
marginally significant negative effect on women’s (Wald p-values = 0.089 in Model 2 specifica-
tion) effort allocation decisions.
We also observe that the number of completed sliders is lower for women than for men in
the CharityImage treatment (the coefficient of FemaleCharityImage is negative in two model
specifications in Table 5). This result is in turn consistent with the previous literature showing
that men are more motivated by social-image concerns and engage in more status-seeking
behaviour compared to women [31]. Women on the other hand are more likely to demon-
strate wallflower effect—aversion to stand out—in their cooperative and altruistic behaviour
when the behaviour can be publicly observed [38].
Table 6. Incentives and gender.
Dependent Variable: Number of Completed Sliders in the Multi-task part
Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Prize 45.20���
(8.14)
48.63��� (7.58) 21.09��
(8.11)
22.20��
(8.56)
Charity 22.45���
(3.04)
13.81�� (5.38) 19.06
(2.81)
24.41��� (3.65)
CharityImage 13.34���
(3.23)
26.38��� (5.37) 17.00���
(1.03)
18.12��� (2.82)
(Wald p-value)
Prize = Charity (<0.001) (0.001) (0.814) (0.846)
Prize = CharityImage (<0.001) (0.006) (0.465) (0.650)
Charity = CharityImage (0.027) (0.018) (0.619) (0.089)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Constant 17.44��� (1.65) -33.61 (21.71) 17.75��� (0.82) -26.71 (23.05)
N 92 92 118 118
Adj R2 0.245 0.261 0.087 0.146
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression. Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses. � 10%
�� 5%
��� 1% significance levels. Controls include the variables elicited in the mid-study questionnaire, SliderSingletask performance as a measure of ability and number of
subjects in a session. The p-values for pairwise treatment comparisons are from post-estimation Wald test.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t006
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Our results are also consistent with the findings that men are more motivated by competi-
tive incentives where they can excel compared to their peers. The highly significant difference
between CharityImage and Prize treatments for men (Wald p-value<0.000), though shows
that a more drastic change in effort levels comes from the financial prize expectations rather
than purely rank based incentive of scoring in the top three compared to the peers. We observe
that while a quarter of variability in effort allocation decisions of men can be explained by the
treatment conditions, only 8.7% of the variability can be explained for women which further
increases to 14.6% with addition of other observable characteristics such as economics prefer-
ences. This in turn indicates that incentives can predict effort decisions of men more than of
women, shedding light on how gender differences in organizations may be more rigid to be
tackled with the help of incentives. We discuss this point in more detail in the concluding
section.
Result 4. For men, competitive incentives are more effective compared to social-value,
and social-image incentives to raise effort levels in the slider task. For women, competitive,
social-value and social-image incentives are equally effective in raising effort levels.
An additional analysis of the heterogeneous effects of incentives separately on women’s and
men’s effort allocation decisions is presented in Table 7. Most notably, we find a significant
Table 7. Testing for heterogeneity in effectiveness of incentives by gender.
Prize Charity CharityImage
Men:
SliderSingletask 1.43 (1.06) 0.06 (.49) 0.85 (.26)��
Age 0.33 (2.44) -0.24 (.52) 0.33 (.59)
Risk Taking 1.38 (9.60) 0.15 (4.00) 1.77 (5.77)
Competitive 16.85 (35.40) -13.87 (11.19) -11.95 (6.15)�
Donation Attitude -0.40 (7.24) 7.026 (1.82)�� 1.45 (1.31)
Favorite ST 40.35 (40.10) -4.74 (8.73) 6.24 (14.74)
Favorite CZT 1.67 (18.63) 4.95 (7.02) -2.32 (14.83)
NumberSubjects -5.79 (9.23) 2.48 (.64)� -3.77 (2.37)
Const 10.53 (91.09) -32.27 (45.49) 20.21 (40.62)
N 26 19 29
Adj R2 0.029 0.042 0.001
Women:
SliderSingletask 1.18 (.76) 0.29 (.27) 0.87 (.59)
Age 1.99 (2.06) 0.49 (.95) 0.10 (.22)
Risk Taking 3.16 (5.02) -5.21 (2.60) 0.61 (2.31)
Competitive 19.29 (11.70) 0.61 (12.05) -5.21 (6.47)
Donation Attitude 2.64 (2.13) 0.90 (6.31) 4.23 (2.31)
Favorite ST 34.27 (17.97) -2.92 (7.07) 3.46 (12.11)
Favorite CZT 20.44 (16.96) 2.51 (12.24) -3.14 (4.87)
NumberSubjects -12.49 (6.72) -1.24 (1.69) -0.64 (2.69)
Const 29.65 (82.57) 50.13 (57.44) -16.62 (19.49)
N 26 32 36
Adj R2 0.0165 0.002 0.117
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression. Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses. NumberSubjects is the number of subjects
in a session as a measure of probability of winning the prize/award.
� 10%
�� 5%, ��� 1% significance levels.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080.t007
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positive effect of self-reported donation attitudes on men’s effort allocation in the slider task of
the Charity treatment while no such correlation is detected for women. Men’s effort donation
decisions are hence, governed by their preferences for charities and social institutions. Wom-
en’s effort allocation decision, on the other hand, may be affected by perceived norms of dona-
tion rather than their own preferences for donating, a measure that we have not elicited in our
experiment. Previous literature shows significant predictive power of norms on giving behav-
iour [61], [62], and how it differs according to gender [12].
Result 5. The difference in the effectiveness of incentives between men and women can-
not be solely explained by their self-reported economic preferences.
Conclusion
The incentive effects on women and men’s selection to work on one task or another is remark-
ably different from each other. We find that while men are more responsive to competitive
and social-image incentives being applied to a fixed rate paying task, women exert similar
amount of effort when competitive, social-value and social-image incentive is applied on the
fixed rate paying task.
Our findings on differential effects of incentives on women’s and men’s effort levels con-
tribute to the field studies analyzing selection effects into the public and private sector educa-
tion providers [63], selection effect into more social or financial online work environments
[39] and studies on incentive effects in various laboratory experiments [8], [31], [60]. While
some studies find that women are more willing to exert effort in social-value generating tasks
and tend to self-select into social environments more often [12], [13], [24] when they are given
a choice of social-value and piece-rate generating tasks, they do not exert more effort in social-
value tasks than men or than when they are given a choice between competitive and piece-rate
generating tasks.
Furthermore, although publicly awarding top three donors in a lab experiment might seem
artificial, the incentives in our CharityImage treatment affect exerted effort levels of men simi-
larly positively as public recognition of employees and students analyzed in natural field set-
tings [34]. Our results, moreover, resemble [35] findings from laboratory experiments. A
marginally negative effect of public recognition on women’s performance, on the other hand,
is consistent with recent findings in the laboratory experiment that investigate ‘wallflower’
effects: [38] find that women are more likely to avoid standing out when their behavior, in this
case their donations to a charity, can be publicly observed. We cannot rule out that the speci-
ficities of our experimental design (i.e., awarding top three performers and public recognition
in a laboratory setting) might have influenced this finding. A similar setup in an environment
in which the employees’ self-esteem is more closely linked to their work might increase the
positive incentive effects of social-image for men and eliminate negative incentives effects of
social-image for women. However, the effects could also be reversed, for instance if the share
of shy or introverted employees in the work force is sufficiently large. This implication needs
further investigation.
While some studies have previously found men responding more strongly to relative per-
formance feedback and competitive incentives [64], others find that men and women do not
react differently to competitive situations per se [34–36]. Taken together these results may
indicate that gender differences in competitive behavior may depend on the characteristics of
the competition, such as for example, size of the prize (Gill & Prowse 2014) or the presence of
a second task as in our experiment.
Similar to previous studies [34], [35], [60] we find that more able individuals react more
positively to competitive environments in both of our Prize and CharityImage treatments.
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However, differently from previous studies [47], overall, we do not find predictive power of
self-reported economic attitudes (competitiveness, risk, confidence and social) on effort levels
allocated to competitive, social-value or social-image tasks. We only find that men’s attitudes
towards charities and other non-profit organizations predict allocated effort levels to social-
value task in the Charity treatment. This in turn, suggests the low power of self-reported mea-
sures to predict behavior in lab experiments and potentially field surveys contrary to the find-
ings of the previous literature. This result is in itself an important contribution to the literature
using self-reported non-incentivized measures of economic attitudes.
One limitation of our study is that using real effort tasks in experiments causes the experi-
menter to lose control of costs and benefits of the task. The output of the task depends both on
the effort provided and individual abilities and skills (and in most cases in a non-linear way).
This adds noise to our results and possible mitigates the effect sizes. The literature is currently
split into advantages and disadvantages of using real effort tasks weighing the benefits of add-
ing realism and external validity while preserving control and internal validity in experiments
(for a short discussion see [43], [65]. Secondly, the generalizability of the results to more than
two task setting is not clear. While we adopted two tasks as simple case for the current research
aims, we acknowledge that with more than two tasks and thus more than two incentives, the
effort allocation problem may be different. However, given our analytical framework there is
no reason for a rational agent to behave differently when making a choice of effort across more
than two tasks as compared to just two tasks. Not incentivizing the elicitation of socio-eco-
nomic preferences is another limitation of the study which we have discussed before. Future
research should investigate if the results would differ if we have more than two multi-task envi-
ronment and whether economic preferences are incentivized.
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